Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2015-30

ESSAY
WHY ISN’T CONGRESS MORE CORRUPT?
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

Richard L. Hasen
rhasen@law.uci.edu

University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law

The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at:

WHY ISN’T CONGRESS MORE CORRUPT?:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
Richard L. Hasen*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the indictment of New York State Assembly Speaker
Sheldon Silver on corruption charges, law professor (and recent reformist
gubernatorial candidate) Zephyr Teachout published an op-ed in the New
York Times entitled “Legalized Bribery.”1 In it, she argued that campaign
contributions are a “gateway drug” to bribes and that politicians are “precorrupted” by taking campaign contributions and doing favors for
contributors.2 She wants campaign finance limits, public financing, and
limits on outside income for legislators.3 Although Teachout used powerful
rhetoric and suggested worthy reforms, I see her as offering an empirical
hypothesis about the relationship between campaign contributions and
bribery: the easier it is to take campaign contributions, and the higher the
contribution limits, the more politicians are primed to be bribed and
therefore the more public corruption cases will emerge.
But if campaign contributions lead to corruption, why do we not see
more corruption in Congress? After all, members of Congress may take up
to $5,400 each election;4 they also may set up leadership political action
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to
Emily Cross, Timothy Duong, and Linet Mardyrosian for research assistance and to
Christina Tsou for library assistance. Thanks to Michael Johnston and David Primo and to
participants at the Fordham Law Review symposium on Fighting Corruption in America and
Abroad, particularly co-panelists Clare Huntington, Larry Lessig, and Zephyr Teachout, for
useful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Nick Confessore for pointing me to the
New York “housekeeping” accounts. For an overview of the Fordham symposium, see Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword: Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015).
1. Zephyr Teachout, Opinion, Legalized Bribery, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/zephyr-teachout-on-sheldon-silver-corruptionand-new-york-politics.html [http://perma.cc/VQ6R-R93Q].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Rebecca Ballhaus, FEC Raises Contribution Caps for 2016, WALL STREET J.:
WASH. WIRE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/02/02/fec-raisescontribution-caps-for-2016/ [http://perma.cc/N26D-Z76G]. The amount was $1000 per
election (or $2000 per election cycle) until 2002, when the McCain-Feingold law raised it to
$2000 per election (or $4000 per election cycle) and indexed that amount to inflation.
Campaign Finance Law Quick Reference for Reporters, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml#Contribution%20Limitations%20and
%20Prohibitions (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/6NNC-Q575].
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committees (PACs) to take more money often used to benefit themselves,5
and now they can help Super PACs raise money.6 Further, prosecutors and
the media have great incentives to uncover public corruption of our national
legislature. Yet, as this Article shows, we see much more public corruption
prosecuted on the state and local levels than in the U.S. Congress. New
York legislators, for example, are seven times more likely to be convicted
of corruption-related offenses than members of Congress.7 Additionally,
public corruption prosecution rates vary significantly from state to state, in
ways that seem uncorrelated with campaign finance laws. The preliminary
evidence does not support the Teachout hypothesis.
In this short Article, I explore three possible explanations for relatively
low rates of bribery and corruption in Congress compared to many states. I
then make suggestions for reform based upon these explanations. First, the
presence of muckracking media, widely consumed by the relevant public,
deters corruption. A recent study in the American Economic Review
demonstrates that state capitals that are far from population centers
experience more corruption, likely because of the absence of enough
investigative media and avid consumers of such media.8 The study uses
geographical isolation and a concomitant lack of accountability to explain
state variations in corruption rates.9 The logic of the study also may explain
the relative lack of corruption in Congress, where media scrutiny is by far
the most intense in the United States.
Second, thanks to gridlock, complex rules, and committee structures,
members of Congress may have less influence to sell than state and local
officials, and therefore there is less demand by corrupt persons and entities
to bribe them. This hypothesis is plausible but uncertain. Members of
Congress may have important informal powers even in the era of gridlock
that are bribe worthy. Further, proving this hypothesis would require a
good measure of relative legislative power.
Finally, part-time legislators may have greater incentive to act corruptly
than full-time legislators because of a need for additional money to

5. 60 Minutes: Washington’s Open Secret: Profitable PACs (CBS television broadcast
Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/washingtons-open-secret-profitable-pacs/
[http://perma.cc/2ET6-HBKY]. As the television program explained:
Over time the leadership PACs that were created as a way for congressional
leaders of both parties, to raise money and distribute it to their members, have
evolved into something different. Today, nearly every congressman and senator
has a leadership PAC, not just the leaders. And they are used to solicit
contributions from friends and supporters in order to advance their political
agendas, their careers and, in many cases, their lifestyle.
Id.
6. Aaron Bycoffe, FEC Allows Candidate to Solicit Limited Contributions for Super
PACs, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 30, 2011), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/06/30/
fec-allows-candidates-solicit-limited-contributions-super-pacs/ [http://perma.cc/ZQ94-NXH
Z].
7. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
8. Felipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and
Corruption: Evidence from U.S. States, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2456 (2014).
9. See generally id.
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supplement their incomes. Indeed, pointing to the Silver case10 and
allegations that bribes to Silver were hidden as outside income, Teachout
calls for limits on outside compensation for New York legislators.11 This
argument appears logical, yet the preliminary evidence does not support the
claim that the part-time nature of a state legislature or low legislator
compensation are positively correlated with a state’s level of public
corruption.
In the end, campaign financing and public corruption are separate
problems demanding separate solutions. Based upon my preliminary
analysis, I suggest we deal with public corruption primarily through
subsidies of investigative journalism on the state level (“the ProPublica
model”) and through appropriate law enforcement. The campaign finance
problem is essentially one of inequality, not corruption, and we should use
public financing and campaign limits to insure greater equality.
I. THE LACK OF CONNECTION BETWEEN CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
AND THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
If campaign contributions are a gateway drug to bribery, the bigger the
dose of the former, the more likely the addiction to the latter. But the
evidence from across the states does not show such a simple relationship.
In Table 1, I list the top five states ranked in terms of the most federal
public corruption prosecutions from 1996 to 2010 and list the individual
contribution limits to those donating to a candidate for the lower house in
each state.12

10. See William Rashbaum & Thomas Kaplan, Sheldon Silver, Assembly Speaker, Took
Millions in Payoffs U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/23/nyregion/speaker-of-new-york-assembly-sheldon-silver-is-arrested-in-corruption
-case.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/3NZK-M3XG].
11. See Teachout, supra note 1.
12. The data on public corruption contributions in the next three tables comes from
Harry Enten, Ranking the States from the Most to Least Corrupt, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 23,
2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ranking-the-states-from-most-to-least-corrupt/ [http:
//perma.cc/XT8H-7WQE], and DICK SIMPSON ET AL., CHICAGO AND ILLINOIS, LEADING THE
PACK IN CORRUPTION (2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20140402153827/http://www.
uic.edu/depts/pols/ChicagoPolitics/leadingthepack.pdf (looking at public corruption
prosecutions from 1976 to 2010) [http://perma.cc/MV3G-T546]. The data on current
campaign contribution limits comes from NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
documents/legismgt/Limits_to_Candidates_2012-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/CU6U-C3WJ].
Some of these limits no doubt changed during the 1976 to 2010 period, and a more nuanced
analysis would have to look at potential changed limits during this period to fully flesh out
the relationship.
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Table 1

States with Most Public
Corruption Convictions

Contribution Limit for
Assembly Candidate

1. New York
2. California
3. Illinois
4. Florida
5. Pennsylvania

$4100/election
$4100/election
$5300/election cycle
$1000/election
Unlimited

The contribution limitations range from the relatively low $1000 per
election in Florida to unlimited contributions in Pennsylvania. There is no
obvious relationship shown by the chart. This analysis is of limited value
for two reasons, however: First, states differ in size, and therefore absolute
numbers of corruption prosecutions can be deceptive; bigger states should
see more corruption prosecutions even if corruption levels do not vary
across states. Second, looking at the size of contribution limitations in
isolation does not tell us if there is variation between high corruption states
and low corruption states. It should be that contribution limits are higher on
average in the high corruption states.
Tables 2 and 3 remedy these problems. Table 2 lists the contribution
limitations in the five states with the most public corruption prosecutions
per capita. Table 3 does the same for the five states with the fewest
corruption prosecutions per capita.
Table 2

States with Most Public
Corruption Convictions
Per Capita

Contribution Limit for
Assembly Candidate

1. Louisiana
2. Mississippi
3. Alaska
4. South Dakota
5. North Dakota

$2500/election
Unlimited
$500/year
$1000/year
Unlimited
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Table 3

States with Fewest Public
Corruption Convictions
Per Capita

Contribution Limit for
Assembly Candidate

46. Minnesota
47. New Hampshire
48. Utah
49. Washington
50. Oregon

$1000/election
$1000/election
Unlimited
$900/election
Unlimited

There is no appreciable difference in the variation of the contribution
limitations in the five worst states compared to the five best states. In each
group, two of the states have unlimited contributions, and the other three
states have relatively low contribution limits. Further, only one of the ten
states of those at the top and the bottom—Minnesota—offers candidates
partial public financing. The amount of public corruption, then, does not
seem correlated with the basic campaign finance rules.13
Further evidence that the size of campaign contribution limits does not
matter in terms of the number of corruption prosecutions comes from
comparing congressional convictions. By my count, only six members of
Congress from 2000 to 2014 were convicted of bribery or similar offenses
related to their congressional service.14 This compares to fifteen New York
state legislators during the same period.15 These figures do not include
13. Overview of State Laws on Public Financing, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaignsoverview.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/T7X2-MB7F]. There is also an
endogeneity problem: some states, but not all states, may adopt low limits because of high
rates of public corruption. This is not the first article to question the lack of simple
connections between campaign finance or bribery and political outcomes. See generally
Stephen Ansolabehere, John de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is There So Little
Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003); Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo &
Timothy Groseclose, Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUS. & POL.
75 (2000); Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, Trivial Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A
Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, 78 PUB. CHOICE 305 (1994).
14. They are: Jim Traficant (D-OH), Randy “Duke” Cunningham (R-CA), Bob Ney (ROH), William Jefferson (D-LA), Jesse Jackson, Jr. (D-IL), and Rick Renzi (R-AZ). A list of
federal officeholders convicted of crimes from 2000 to the present appears at List of
American Federal Politicians Convicted of Crimes, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/List_of_American_federal_politicans_convicted_of_crimes (last visited Oct. 21, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/X6VG-RTYZ].
15. The convicted Assembly Members and Senators are: William Boyland, Jr., Gloria
Davis, Pedro Espada, Efrain Gonzalez, Diane Gordon, Roger Green, Shirley Huntley, Carl
Kruger, Vincent Leibell, Brian McLaughlin, Clarence Norman, Tony Seminerio, Nicholas
Spano, Eric Stevenson, and Guy Velella. For a list of New York State legislators involved in
scandal, see Jeremy Smerd, Big Reason NY Legislators Leave Office?: Corruption, CRAIN’S
N.Y. BUS. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20110214/FREE/1102
19936/big-reason-ny-legislators-leave-office-corruption [http://perma.cc/GW7R-EB3P], and
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legislators who were acquitted, such as Joseph Bruno,16 or those involved in
noncorruption scandals, such as spousal abuse, or non-legislators, such as
governors, acting corruptly. Of course, the average size of congressional
districts is larger than the average size of New York State Assembly or
Senate districts, making the “per capita” comparison look even better for
Congress and worse for New York. And there are only 213 New York
legislators, compared to 535 senators and members of Congress. The
percentage of members involved in incidents of corruption within the New
York legislature during the relevant period—about 7 percent, or 15 out of
213 members—is seven times greater than the percentage in Congress—
about 1 percent, or 6 out of 535 members.17
This methodology is not perfect. Federal public corruption figures
include all public officials and witnesses and not just legislators. My
methodology assumes that federal prosecutors have equal resources and
desires to pursue public corruption in all states and that unscrupulous
officials have equal ability to hide their activities in each state. This may
not be true, for example, depending upon the state’s campaign finance
disclosure rules. Further, prosecutors may be more reluctant to bring suit
against members of Congress, fearing public embarrassment over losing a
high profile case. This may explain the failure of the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) to prosecute U.S. Senator John Ensign for corruption.18 Or
perhaps there are partisan biases where a U.S. attorney from one party in a
particular state seeks to prosecute members of the other party—a frequent,
although often unproven, allegation.19
Susanne Craig et al., The Many Faces of State Political Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/23/nyregion/23moreland-commissionand-new-york-political-scandals.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5ZBV-QMXM]. Joseph Bruno
was recently acquitted on charges. See Reuven Blau, Former Senate Majority Leader Joseph
Bruno Defends Sheldon Silver, Says He Deserves Fair Trial, DAILY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/joseph-bruno-defends-sheldon-silver-article1.2133871 [http://perma.cc/C6XZ-D8F3]. Charges remain pending against John Sampson,
see Greg B. Smith, State Sen. John Sampson’s Embezzlement Case Exposes Flaw in
Oversight of Foreclosed Property Sales, DAILY NEWS (May 5, 2013), http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/politics/state-sen-john-sampson-embezzled-440g-foreclosure-fundsarticle-1.1337820 [http://perma.cc/Q6AB-ZSDP], Malcolm Smith, see Michael Wilson &
William K. Rashbaum, Lawmakers in New York Tied to Bribery Plot in Mayor Race, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/nyregion/state-senator-and-citycouncilman-accused-of-trying-to-rig-mayors-race.html [http://perma.cc/H94B-DG8J], and
Sheldon Silver, see Rashbaum & Kaplan, supra note 10.
16. See Blau, supra note 15.
17. I computed these figures using the data cited supra notes 14–15.
18. Senator John Ensign of Nevada was investigated on corruption-related charges but
was not charged with any crime. See Eric Lipton, Senator Ensign to Resign Amid Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/us/politics/22ensign.html
[http://perma.cc/3XLX-D9DE]; Eric Lichtblau, Documents Reveal Details of F.B.I. Inquiry
into Nevada Senator, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/
30/us/politics/documents-reveal-details-of-fbi-investigation-into-disgraced-senator-johnensign.html [http://perma.cc/D3T7-HPPU].
19. See Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring Legal and Illegal Corruption
in the United States: Some Results from the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Corruption
in America Survey 5 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 58, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579300 [http://perma.cc/9H8P-JSAB];
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In addition, I cannot measure any “culture” of corruption or other
extraneous factors. Nor do I consider whether the opportunity costs for
congressional bribery are higher because non-indicted members of
Congress have a higher expected income stream after leaving office than
non-indicted state legislators.20
A full regression analysis might tease out additional factors not seen by
my basic look at top and bottom states.21 I am also not looking at all
aspects of a state’s campaign finance system. In New York, for example,
parties have soft money “housekeeping” funds, which provide a way of
gaining influence over legislative leaders through very large donations.22
That may explain at least part of how New York acts as such an outlier and
provides moderate support for the Teachout thesis, but there is no evidence
these funds are being used on a widespread basis in the states that see more
corruption.
Adriana Cordis and Jeffrey Milyo also fault the use of the public
corruption statistics provided by the DOJ as an accurate measure of
corruption across states.23 Using a different methodology, relying on the
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) database of criminal
prosecution data,24 they arrive at a somewhat different set of top and bottom
corruption states. Using TRAC’s list of states instead of the DOJ data,
however, leads to the same conclusion: no discernable pattern in levels of
corruption based upon campaign finance rules.25
Richard L. Hasen, Just Politics: Just Because Politics Can Be Ugly Doesn’t Make It a
Crime, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2014/08/the_perry_indictment_is_one_more_example_of_criminalizing_politi
cs_watch.html?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw_top [http://perma.cc/V8QR-4T7J].
20. On post-congressional careers, see Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane & Antonio
Merlo, A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(2005).
21. See Dincer & Johnston, supra note 19. Dincer and Johnston use a measure of illegal
and legal corruption tied to reporters’ perceptions of corruption in a state. This may be one
measure of political culture, as is their measure of “moralistic” cultures taken from Daniel
Elazar and used later in the paper. But their definitions of corruption are loose enough to
include wholly legal, if unsavory, activity, which I am trying not to count in this analysis.
Rather, I am trying to explain only the lack of many cases of illegal corruption in Congress.
That New York does not make Dincer and Johnston’s list (see infra Table 7) of the “most
corrupt” states makes me question the survey’s usefulness for my purposes.
22. Michelle Breidenbach, In New York State, Sky Is the Limit on Donations to Political
Party “Housekeeping” Accounts, SYRACUSE.COM (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf/2013/10/housekeeping_committees_campaign_finance_albany_moreland_co
mmission.html [http://perma.cc/A4AE-47PZ].
23. See Adriana Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring Public Corruption in the United
States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions 34 fig.1 (Dep’t of
Econ., Univ. of Mo., Working Paper No. 1322, 2013), http://economics.missouri.edu/
working-papers/2013/wp1322_milyo.pdf [http://perma.cc/M49M-6MCV].
24. See TRANSACTIONAL RECS. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/ (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/476W-DNUB].
25. According to Cordis and Milyo, the five most corrupt states (as measured by number
of convictions using the TRAC database) are: Mississippi, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Illinois,
and Tennessee. Id. at 43 tbl.5. Mississippi has unlimited contributions. Id. Kentucky has
$1000 contribution limits per election. Id. Rhode Island has $1000 contribution limits per
year. Id. Illinois has $5300 contribution limits per election cycle. Id. Tennessee has $1500
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Cordis and Milyo’s data also includes claims against public employees
and witnesses who are not elected officials but have been prosecuted for
corruption. With the help of research assistants, I counted up convictions
(and plea deals) of state legislators on federal bribery or related charges
from 2011 through the beginning of April 2015, primarily using the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) public corruption database. The search
yielded sixteen cases: seven from New York, two from Illinois, and one
each from Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Massachusetts, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Rhode Island.26 In the same period, there was one congressional
conviction: Representative Rick Renzi.27 Once again, there is nothing
about these states’ campaign finance laws that seems to indicate a special
tie to corruption problems. In particular, New York’s law is not so different
from these other laws to explain such a discrepancy.28 Prosecutorial zeal,
and perhaps the high profile of the U.S. attorney position in New York and
pressure to create a high profile, may be a big part of the explanation for the
New York case.
In short, using a variety of crude empirical approaches, the early
evidence suggests that something else, aside from the ability to accept
campaign contributions, is driving the amount of bribery and related
convictions. Whatever the driver, the straightforward Teachout thesis
appears incorrect.
II. EXPLORING POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
FOR VARIATIONS IN LEVELS OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
In this part, I consider three possible explanations for variations across
states in levels of corruption prosecutions.
A. Muckraking Media Read Widely by the Public
The most plausible explanation I have come across so far for varying
levels of public corruption connects geography, media, and accountability.
In a recent article in the American Economic Review, Felipe Campante and
Quoc-Anh Do examine the hypothesis that public corruption in a state is
greater when the state capital is relatively far from the state’s population
centers.29 They describe their findings in their article abstract:
We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater
levels of corruption across [U.S.] states, in line with the view that this

limits per election. Id. The five least corrupt states are: Wyoming, Iowa, Kansas, New
Hampshire, and Colorado. Id. Wyoming has $1500 limits per election. Id. Iowa allows
unlimited contributions. Id. Kansas has $500 limits per election. Id. New Hampshire has
$1000 limits per election. Id. Colorado has $200 per election. Id.
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27. I have posted a spreadsheet of the sixteen cases at http://electionlawblog.org/wpcontent/uploads/hasen-corruption-data.xlsx (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
85X4-C6CK]. The FBI Public Corruption database is available at http://www.fbi.gov/
collections/public-corruption (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/QVW8-4G79].
28. See supra Table 1 (listing New York and other states’ contribution limit laws).
29. Campante & Do, supra note 8.
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isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the
spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different
accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when
readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are
less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less
in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with
more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.30

The story Campante and Do tell is one of accountability driven by media
coverage. The media covers state politics less frequently when state
capitals are isolated, and readers in such states consequently read state
politics news less. Voter turnout in state elections is lower in states with
isolated capitals as well, perhaps because voters believe they do not have
enough information to cast intelligent votes or because there is no scandal
news to give voters a signal or reason to vote. The lack of accountability
creates an opening for corruption.
The authors’ findings on campaign finance are especially interesting.
Campaign contributions are higher in states with isolated capitals, and
donations in those states are dominated by people who live closer to those
isolated capitals.31 The authors speculate that “with lower media scrutiny
and reduced involvement by voters, an isolated capital opens the way for a
stronger role of money in shaping political outcomes.”32 This evidence
provides more limited support for Teachout’s gateway drug hypothesis, in
the context of campaign contributions in isolated capitals in which no one is
watching.
The geographic/accountability explanation also provides good reason for
why there is not more corruption in Congress. The amount of media
concentration in Washington, D.C., covering politics dwarfs coverage of
any state capital. Every move, every campaign finance filing, and every
congressional vote is a potential story for enterprising political reporters.
The proliferation of news operations and websites from Politico to Vox to
FiveThirtyEight, as well as new breaking political news operations and
blogs on traditional sites such as the New York Times and Washington Post,
further create demand for media content, especially scandalous political
content. In this environment, a corrupt politician has to work very hard to
keep things secret.
B. Members of Congress Have Less Influence to Sell
The geographic/accountability explanation seems to go a long way in
explaining the relative differences in the number of corruption convictions
across states. But there are other possibilities as well. Another explanation

30. Id. at 2456.
31. Id. at 2475–76.
32. Id. at 2478. The key is not geography but accountability through a strong press. My
impression of the corruption in the small cities around Los Angeles is that, until the recent
Bell scandal, there was little media attention paid to local politics and therefore less
accountability and more corruption.
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focuses not on the chances of corruption detection, but on the demand for
corrupt politicians.
It may be that the general power structure in Washington gives individual
members of Congress less power than typical individual legislators. An
individual U.S. representative, especially one who is not a committee chair
or in the leadership of the majority party, has very little leverage to offer
something of use to many people looking for a special interest deal.
In contrast, in state (and local) governments, legislators may have greater
power to take care of matters of more local concern. Some state legislatures
are organized with local delegations having great power to decide matters
of local concern. State legislators often help steer contracts toward those
who do them favors.
Consider a recent New York bribery case involving Assemblyman Eric
Stevenson. Stevenson got favorable legislation for a local nursing home in
exchange for a relatively small $22,000 bribe.33 He was able to deliver
something that an unscrupulous person was willing to pay for, and there
were not numerous legislative obstacles to Stevenson doing so.
While the argument that members of Congress have relatively less power
than average state legislators is plausible, it would take much more work to
see if this explanation provides any leverage to explain variations in states.
We would need a measure of relative legislator power across states.
Further, there are many measures of power. For example, it may be
wrong to assume that individual members of Congress or the U.S. Senate
lack power even given gridlock and committee structures. In addition to the
power of individual senators to withhold consent from virtually any Senate
business, subject to an override by Senate vote, U.S. senators seem to have
considerable power to exercise informally in dealing with executive
agencies. Consider the current corruption prosecution of U.S. Senator
Robert Menendez from New Jersey. According to a federal prosecutor,
“Robert Menendez, a U.S. senator, and Dr. Salomon Melgen, a Florida
ophthalmologist, were indicted today in connection with a bribery scheme
in which Menendez allegedly accepted gifts from Melgen in exchange for
using the power of his Senate office to benefit Melgen’s financial and
personal interests.”34
If it is true that U.S. senators have great relative power, then the power
explanation does not hold up well to the evidence of corruption convictions.
In the 2000 to 2014 period, none of the six convicted federal legislators
came from the U.S. Senate; all came from the House.35 As of this writing,
Senator Menendez has not been convicted of a corruption-related crime.
33. Benjamin Weiser, Former Bronx Assemblyman Sentenced for Corruption, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/nyregion/former-bronxassemblyman-sentenced-for-corruption.html [http://perma.cc/7NC7-X54M].
34. Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, Menendez Claims Innocence After Indictment,
CNN (Apr. 2, 2015) (quoting Justice Department spokesperson Peter Carr),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/politics/robert-menendez-corruption-charges/ [http://perma.
cc/K3QA-KB3N].
35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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In all, without a good measure of the true power of legislators, this
hypothesis is too difficult to test. Even if we tested it and found that
legislators with greater power are likely to be bribed more, it is not clear
what reform would flow from such a finding.
C. Part-Time Legislators and Legislative Compensation
A final potential explanation for variance in the amount of public
corruption is whether the legislature is part-time and, relatedly, whether the
state compensates legislators poorly. The theory is that there should be
more corruption in those states in which legislators are undercompensated
because more financially strapped legislators would be willing to supply
government favors for money. Further, part-time legislatures must
necessarily allow legislators to get outside income in order to have a decent
living, and outside income becomes an easier way to hide illegal payoffs (as
alleged in the Silver indictment).36
The preliminary evidence, however, contradicts the argument. Once
again, I compare the top five least corrupt states per capita with the top five
most corrupt states, and I use the National Conference of State Legislature’s
coding of the type of legislature (a “hybrid” is somewhere between a fulltime legislature with professional staff and a part-time legislature). Tables
4 and 5 show once again that no distinct pattern emerges. Two of the top
five and bottom five states, for example, have part-time legislatures with
low pay and small staff.
Table 4

States with Most Public
Corruption Convictions
Per Capita

Type of Legislature

1. Louisiana
2. Mississippi
3. Alaska
4. South Dakota
5. North Dakota

Hybrid (Middle)
Part-time (Lite)
Full-time (Lite)
Part-time, low pay, small staff
Part-time, low pay, small staff

36. See Rashbaum & Kaplan, supra note 10.
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Table 5

States with Fewest Public
Corruption Convictions
Per Capita

Type of Legislature

46. Minnesota
47. New Hampshire
48. Utah
49. Washington
50. Oregon

Hybrid
Part-time, low pay, small staff
Part-time, low pay, small staff
Hybrid
Hybrid

There also is no strong evidence connecting the amount of legislative
compensation to the amount of corruption. The rates of pay in the top five
states, aside from Alaska, are pretty low.37 New Hampshire, the fourth
least corrupt state, pays its legislators just $200 for a two year term.38
Table 6

States with Most Public
Corruption Convictions
Per Capita

Compensation

1. Louisiana

$16,800 (Plus $6000 for
expenses)

2. Mississippi
3. Alaska

$10,000
$50,400
$6000/session (For
committees)
$162/day during legislative
sessions

4. South Dakota
5. North Dakota

37. See infra Table 6.
38. See infra Tables 6, 7.
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Table 7

States with Fewest Public
Corruption Convictions
Per Capita

Compensation

46. Minnesota
47. New Hampshire
48. Utah
49. Washington
50. Oregon

$31,140
$200/two-year term
$273/day
$42,106
$129/day

III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION:
TWO PROBLEMS, TWO SOLUTIONS
The issues raised by campaign finance and the issues raised by public
corruption are mostly separate. Surely, campaign contributions can be
bribes, and unlimited campaign contributions, especially when the funds
can be converted to personal use, raise corruption concerns.
But the primary problem with our increasingly unregulated campaign
system is one of inequality. Those with great economic power can use their
wealth to parlay it into outsized political power, influencing both the
outcome of elections as well as public policy. As I argue elsewhere,39 the
way to ameliorate some of the inequality is a combination of public
financing in the form of campaign finance vouchers and limits on
contributions and spending.
The corruption problem is addressed more directly through appropriate
prosecution and public accountability. The Campante and Do research on
geography and corruption shows that the key to this accountability is an
aggressive and muckraking media whose work the public consumes and
acts upon.40 Indeed, in his keynote address to the symposium of which this
Article is a part, Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, pointed to the media’s key role in detecting and ferreting out
corruption.41

39. RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED (forthcoming 2016).
40. Campante & Do, supra note 8.
41. A reporter describing U.S. Attorney Bharara’s remarks wrote, “The media, he stated,
is to serve as the biggest channel to help prevent and limit corruption.” David Malinowski,
NY Prosecutor Preet Bharara Explains How a ‘Veil of Ignorance’ Leads to Corruption,
BENZINGA (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.benzinga.com/news/15/03/5306799/ny-prosecutorpreet-bharara-explains-how-a-veil-of-ignorance-leads-to-corruption [http://perma.cc/J2HZ9AAT]. For video footage of the keynote address, see FORDHAM L. REV., http://fordhamlaw
review.org/articles/fighting-corruption-in-america-and-abroad-keynote-address-by-u-sattorney-preet-bharara (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/PBB2-WU2J]. His
remarks appear at the forty-one minute mark.
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For this reason, my preliminary recommendation for stemming public
corruption is to subsidize muckraking journalism on the state level, along
the lines of the ProPublica model.42 In this model, nonprofit public interest
journalism partners with traditional journalism to provide muckraking
content to local news outlets.43 Scandals sell, and ferreting out scandals is
positively associated with public-regarding legislation.
We can no longer rely on the free market in news coverage to provide
this muckraking journalism. Especially in the internet era, newspaper
coverage of state and local politics is sparse. There is not even enough
money to cover normal state politics. In Los Angeles, for example, all the
local television stations have closed their Sacramento bureaus covering
California state politics.44 Perhaps it is no coincidence that California has
seen its own growing share of corruption prosecutions.45 To take another
example, until recently, smaller local cities surrounding Los Angeles were
rife with corruption in part because there was no aggressive press to pay
attention to the cities’ politics and problems.46 It has only been after the
Bell, California corruption scandal broke that more sustained local media
attention and scandal coverage has led to greater accountability in these
smaller cities.47 Corruption flourishes when no one is watching.
Subsidizing the press for an investigative function is a public good. And
it could save the public money in the long run, as those who would sell out
42. For information on ProPublica’s business model, see Reflections on Progress
Toward Sustainability at ProPublica, KNIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.
knightfoundation.org/press-room/other/reflections-progress-toward-sustainability-propubl/
[http://perma.cc/HBY3-MRPS].
43. See id.
44. Kevin Roderick, ABC Closes Last TV Bureau in Sacramento, Lays Off Nanette
Miranda, L.A. OBSERVED (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.laobserved.com/archive/2013/08/
abc_closes_last_tv_bureau.php [http://perma.cc/NXC9-H9X5].
45. Norimitsu Onishi, California Democrats Await Fallout After 3 Are Caught Up in
Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/us/californiademocrats-await-fallout-after-3-are-caught-up-in-scandals.html [http://perma.cc/62VB-QF
GM].
46. D.J. Waldie, When No One Was Looking: Cudahy, Vernon, Santa Fe Springs, Bell,
SOCAL FOCUS (July 2, 2012), http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/commentary/wherewe-are/when-no-one-was-looking-cudahy-vernon-santa-fe-springs-bell.html [http://perma.cc
/XA7J-BCL8].
In the past 30 years—and this is not a comprehensive list—city officials in La
Puente, Monterey Park, Pico Rivera, Rosemead, Compton, and Temple City were
charged with corruption. A South Gate city treasurer was found to have
embezzled $20 million. A Lynwood mayor pocketed $6 million in kickbacks.
City council members in Vernon continued a regime of startling malfeasance. City
officials in Huntington Park went through several rounds of investigations, as did
those in Hawthorne, Montebello, and Irwindale. Administrators in Bell undertook
so brazen a scheme of looting that District Attorney Steve Cooley called it
“corruption on steroids.” . . . For the past 30 years, the amount and the depth of
the news media coverage of smaller and middle-size cities in Los Angeles County
have declined. The big papers have withered; the little weekly papers are gone.
Over the past 30 years, the level of voter participation in cities with little news
coverage has drifted lower and lower. Turnouts of less than 10 percent of
registered voters are not uncommon.
Id.
47. See id.
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the public interest for a bribe are likely to cost the state significantly more
than the salaries of earnest journalists looking to make state capitals an
honest place.
Members of Congress are less likely to be convicted of corruption than
state legislators, not because they are better people, but because everyone is
watching. When the media can watch closely, and report to an interested
public what they find, corruption should go down.

